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Recent Developments

ARUNDEL CORP. v. MARIE:
A Right of First Refusal Is Void under the Traditional
Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities as well as the
Legislative Modification of that Rule
By: Emily J. King
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a right of first
refusal is void under the traditional common law rule against
perpetuities as well as the legislative modification of that rule.
Arundel Corp. v. Marie, 383 Md. 489, 860 A.2d 886 (2004). The
Court also declined to modify the common law rule, expressing its
belief that any modification should be reserved for the legislature. !d.
On July 28, 1960, Camille and Mary Marie ("Maries")
conveyed a parcel of land, which was part of a tract owned by them, to
the Arundel Corporation ("Arundel"). In consideration of one dollar,
the deed gave Arundel a right of first refusal to purchase the portion of
the property the Maries retained. The Maries agreed that whenever
they or their heirs, executors, administrators or assigns decided to sell
the property, Arundel, its successors and assigns would be offered the
additional property for a price of $2,250 per acre.
Camille Marie, having survived his wife Mary, died intestate.
The couple's children, Olivia Dulany Green and Richard Mercer Marie
("personal representatives"), were appointed personal representatives
of Camille's Estate ("Estate"). The personal representatives wrote to
Arundel and informed the corporation of their intent to sell the
property and distribute all of the Estate assets, free of the right of first
refusal. The personal representatives asked Arundel to disclaim its
interest in the Marie property, but Arundel refused, countering that the
right of first refusal had vested, and therefore was enforceable.
Arundel further claimed that even if the right was void under the
common law rule against perpetuities ("the Rule"), the vesting of their
right of first refusal was in conformance with the modified rule found
in MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS§ 11-103(a) (2004) ("Section 11103 ").
Arundel filed suit in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County,
which granted summary judgment in favor of the personal
representatives, concluding the right of first refusal was void under the
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Rule and could not be saved by Section 11-103. Arundel appealed to
the Court of Special Appeals, but the Court of Appeals of Maryland
issued a writ of certiorari on its own initiative to determine if the right
of first refusal was void under the Rule or if it could be saved by
Section 11-103.
The Rule states, "'[n]o interest is good unless it must vest, if at
all, not later than twenty-one years after some life in being at the
creation of the interest."' !d. at 495, 860 A.2d at 890 (quoting Gray,
The Rule Against Perpetuities, § 201 (41h ed. 1942)). The Rule was
designed to prevent the alienability of property and the controlling of
property by the dead. !d. Since its inception, however, it has confused
many people and presented difficultie~ in application. !d.
The Court of Appeals reasoned that many state legislatures
revised the Rule because of its harsh effect and the often illogical
possibilities it proposes. !d. at 496, 860 A.2d at 891. In 1960, the
Maryland General Assembly passed an earlier version of what is now
Section 11-103(a) of the Estates and Trusts Article. !d. at 497, 860
A.2d at 891. That statute reads as follows:
In applying the rule against perpetuities
to an interest limited to take effect at or
after the termination of one or more life
estates in, or lives of, persons in being
when the period of the rule commences
to run, the validity of the interest shall be
determined on the basis of facts existing
at the termination of one or more life
estates or lives. In this section an
interest which must terminate not later
than the death of one or more persons is
a "life estate" even though it may
terminate at an earlier date.
!d.

The Court determined that the Maryland General Assembly
had several models to choose from when drafting the modification to
the Rule. The first approach is currently in effect in Pennsylvania. !d.
at 498, 860 A.2d at 892. The Pennsylvania method "waits" until the
end of the period allotted by the Rule to "see" if a future interest will
vest. !d. at 497-498, 860 A.2d at 892.
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The second approach originated in Massachusetts and is more
limited than the Pennsylvania approach. !d. at 498, 860 A.2d at 892.
The Massachusetts method "waits" only until the end of the life estate
or life in being to "see" if a future interest will vest. !d. at 498, 860
A.2d at 892. The drafters of this method believed it to be more
realistic than the common law Rule because it removes the absurd
possibilities that could invalidate the vesting of the interest. !d.
The third approach has been adopted by the Kentucky,
Vermont, and Washington legislatures. !d. at 499, 860 A.2d at 893.
This method allows a court to look at the intention of the creator to
determine if an interest is valid and whether to incorporate actual
events, as opposed to possible events, in that consideration. !d. at 500,
860 A.2d at 893.
The fourth approach was developed more recently. In 1986, a
Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities was proposed by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. !d. at
501, 860 A.2d at 893. Under the uniform rule, a "future interest would
be valid if either (1) it complies with the common law rule against
perpetuities, or (2) it vests or terminates within ninety years after its
creation." !d. at 501, 860 A.2d at 893-94.
The Court found that the Maryland General Assembly adopted
the Massachusetts approach. !d. at 502, 860 A.2d at 894. The General
Assembly modified the strict common law Rule by "waiting" until the
end of the life estate or life in being to "see" if the future interest will
vest. !d. at 502, 860 A.2d at 894-95.
The Court of Appeals determined that Arundel's argument that
the statute saves the right of first refusal cannot stand because the right
of first refusal is not sure to vest at the end of a particular life estate or
life in being. !d. at 502, 860 A.2d at 895. The Maries could have sold
their property and activated the right of first refusal at any time during
their lives. !d. at 502-503, 860 A.2d at 895. The Court also reasoned
that the right of first refusal is invalid under the Rule because the
vesting could take place too remotely. !d. at 503, 860 A.2d at 895. It
is possible that neither the Maries nor any of their heirs would ever
actually sell their property. !d.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a right of first
refusal is void under the common law rule against perpetuities, as well
as the Maryland General Assembly's modification of that Rule. The
Court has also declined the opportunity to further modify the Rule,
deeming that to be the job of the Legislature. The Court noted that the
Legislature has, on several occasions, declined to modify the Rule any
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further. It is likely, therefore, that the Rule will not be modified by the
legislature either and will remain in its current format indefinitely, thus
rendering the right of first refusal void indefinitely as well.
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